Conclusion
While the scholars we have considered have some differences with regard to the applicability of Colwell's Rule to John 1:1c and the particular semantic force of THEOS in this clause, they are unanimous in regarding the proper understanding of John's meaning: The Word has all the qualities, attributes, or nature of God, the same God referenced in the previous clause. The absence of the article, all agree, is purposeful; John intends to remove any possibility of a convertible proposition. The definite article signifies a personal distinction, thus the Person of God is in view in John 1:1b. The absence of the article signifies that the nature or essence of God is in view in 1:1c. John is not teaching that the Logos is the same Person as the Father. Nor, do the scholars believe, is John teaching that the Logos is a second god. All agree that the indefinite semantic force is unlikely.
It is my view that those who argue that the definite semantic force would signify a convertible proposition have the best case (but, see note #2, below). The purely qualitative nuance is well-attested in the Greek New Testament3, as has been demonstrated by Harner, Dixon, Wallace, and Hartley. The latter has demonstrated its application to both mass and count terms, and thus its application to THEOS in John 1:1c. It is important to note that even those scholars who maintain that THEOS is definite nevertheless argue that the significance of John's words are virtually identical with those who argue for a qualitative nuance.
Based on the evidence presented here, we may confidently take John's meaning as:
"In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in existence. The Word was intimately with God. And the Word was as to His essence, fully God."4
While the scholars we have considered have some differences with regard to the applicability of Colwell's Rule to John 1:1c and the particular semantic force of THEOS in this clause, they are unanimous in regarding the proper understanding of John's meaning: The Word has all the qualities, attributes, or nature of God, the same God referenced in the previous clause. The absence of the article, all agree, is purposeful; John intends to remove any possibility of a convertible proposition. The definite article signifies a personal distinction, thus the Person of God is in view in John 1:1b. The absence of the article signifies that the nature or essence of God is in view in 1:1c. John is not teaching that the Logos is the same Person as the Father. Nor, do the scholars believe, is John teaching that the Logos is a second god. All agree that the indefinite semantic force is unlikely.
It is my view that those who argue that the definite semantic force would signify a convertible proposition have the best case (but, see note #2, below). The purely qualitative nuance is well-attested in the Greek New Testament3, as has been demonstrated by Harner, Dixon, Wallace, and Hartley. The latter has demonstrated its application to both mass and count terms, and thus its application to THEOS in John 1:1c. It is important to note that even those scholars who maintain that THEOS is definite nevertheless argue that the significance of John's words are virtually identical with those who argue for a qualitative nuance.
Based on the evidence presented here, we may confidently take John's meaning as:
"In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in existence. The Word was intimately with God. And the Word was as to His essence, fully God."4
