Jan 6th Select Committee Initial Findings Report

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TABLE OF CONTENTS TOPLINE 3
INTRODUCTION 3
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT JURISDICTION 5
I: THE SELECT COMMITTEE 5
FORMATION OF SPEAKER PELOSI’S PARTISAN SELECT COMMITTEE 6
SPEAKER PELOSI’S UNPRECEDENTED DECISION TO REJECT MINORITY MEMBER APPOINTMENTS 6
VICE CHAIR—NOT RANKING MEMBER 8
VICE CHAIR CHENEY 8
NO RANKING MINORITY MEMBER 9
A COMMITTEE WITHOUT RULES10
STATED SELECT COMMITTEE OBJECTIVES 10
BUDGET AND STAFF 11
PRIMETIME MEDIA HEARINGS12
CONCLUSION 13
II: ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARANCY: WHAT THE SELECT COMMITTEE DID NOT SHOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 14
MISSING SELECT COMMITTEE RECORDS 15
OVER ONE TERABYTE OF DIGITAL DATA MISSING16
DELETED & ENCRYPTED FILES 18
MISSING TRANSCRIPTS FROM WITNESS INTERVIEWS 19
WHITE HOUSE EMPLOYEE TRANSCRIPTS 20
DHS EMPLOYEE TRANSCRIPTS 32
CASSIDY HUTCHINSON: THE “STAR WITNESS” 33
COLLUSION WITH FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY FANI WILLIS 49
III: DOING THE WORK THE SELECT COMMITTEE FAILED TO DO 50
JANUARY 6: SECURITY FAILURES 50
USCP APPROVAL TO REQUEST D.C. NATIONAL GUARD ON JANUARY 6 RESULTED IN DELAYS 51
January 1, 2021 52
January 3, 2021 53
January 4, 2021 54
January 5, 2021 54
CONTRADICTING TIMELINES: DoD, D.C. NATIONAL GUARD, AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE 55
CAPITOL SECURITY: POLITICIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 61
CAPITOL POLICE BOARD AND SERGEANT AT ARMS 61
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE 63
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES BEFORE JANUARY 6 64
FAILURES IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION ON JANUARY 6 68
CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT 70
PIPE BOMBS NEAR THE RNC AND DNC 71
GALLOWS: WHY DO WE NOT KNOW WHO BUILT THEM 72
IV: SUBCOMMITTEE CORRESPONDENCE AND HEARINGS 73
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE 118TH CONGRESS 74
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 75
WHITE HOUSE 76
SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRPERSON THOMPSON 77
OVERSIGHT HEARINGS OF THE 118th CONGRESS 78

 

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https://cha.house.gov/_cache/files/d/9/d96ba6ce-03fb-4fc8-a4a7-5b5daf19d064/4F510144C1F427873D3298D955C8E19F.initial-findings-report.pdf

TOPLINE
The Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Oversight (“Subcommittee”) Chairman Barry Loudermilk, since early 2023, has been investigating the failures at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, which House Democrats failed to do in the 117th Congress. The purpose of this investigation is to identify and review the numerous security failures on and leading up to January 6, 2021, and to review the creation, operation, and results of Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (“Select Committee”).

Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats spent millions of taxpayer dollars on their politically motivated Select Committee1 yet failed to thoroughly investigate and review the security failures at the Capitol on and before January 6, 2021. Instead, the members of the Select Committee were laser-focused on their effort to promote their pre-determined narrative that President Trump was responsible for the breach of the Capitol on January 6 and should therefore be held accountable, by any means necessary.

Throughout its nearly two years of work, the Select Committee presented uncorroborated, cherry-picked evidence that fit its narrative. The Select Committee did not attempt to hide its bias and, in fact, memorialized its own failures and prejudice when it published its Final Report in December 2022.2 A review of the nearly one-thousand-page report reveals Speaker Pelosi’s multimillion-dollar Select Committee was a political weapon with a singular focus on promoting the narrative that President Trump was responsible for the violence on January 6.

The Select Committee failed to sufficiently investigate the security failures, and as a result, the Capitol is no safer today than it was when the Select Committee was created. In order to properly protect the institution that the framework of American democracy rests upon, Congress must take a serious look at why the Capitol was ill-prepared and what security changes are needed to ensure adequate protection for Members of Congress, the thousands of staff who work in the Capitol complex, and the millions of people who visit the site each year.

The events of January 6, 2021, were preventable. The politicization of Capitol security directly contributed to the many structural and procedural failures witnessed that day. Through the Subcommittee’s robust oversight of the United States Capitol Police (“USCP”) and supporting entities, we are committed to ensuring necessary reforms to USCP operations and the Capitol’s physical security.

 

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INTRODUCTION
The January 6, 2021, attack at the United States Capitol was a dark day for our country. Some individuals broke the law by assaulting United States Capitol Police officers and forcefully breaking through windows and doors to gain access to the Capitol. Thousands of other Americans participated in protests outside of the Capitol.
Since January 6, 2021, over one thousand Americans have been charged with federal crimes by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. 3

Many Members of Congress were in the Capitol on January 6, 2021. That includes the Chairman and multiple members of the Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Oversight who experienced firsthand the violence that occurred that day and mourn the lives lost both on January 6 and thereafter. Reflecting on and analyzing a traumatic event such as January 6 is never an easy task, but it is essential that the American public have access to the facts so that they may draw their own conclusions.

In advance of January 6, 2021, there were known threats against Congress. Due to the anticipated large scale of the scheduled protest activity derived from gathered intelligence, the Capitol and much of the surrounding city adopted an enhanced security posture.4 However, it was not adequate to stop hundreds of protesters determined to get into the Capitol building.

The Subcommittee must investigate the USCP failures that, at least in part, led to the security breakdown that day. The USCP’s mission is to “[p]rotect the Congress — its Members, employees, visitors, and facilities — so it can fulfill its constitutional and legislative responsibilities in a safe, secure and open environment.”5 USCP’s leadership failed in its responsibilities on January 6, 2021. They lacked the leadership, equipment, and training necessary for officers to deal with the challenges of a protest of this size and scale.

To provide full transparency, it is vital for the Subcommittee to review the actions of Congress in the aftermath. After House Democrats impeached President Trump over the events of January 6, 2021, but failed to secure a conviction in the Senate, Speaker Nancy Pelosi established the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (“Select Committee”).6 The Select Committee had one purpose: advance a political narrative using cherry-picked information that supports its overall narrative.

After Speaker Pelosi refused to seat two of the Republican members named by Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy to the Select Committee — further entrenching its partisan purpose —the group of five original Republican appointees, led by Representative Jim Banks, conducted their own investigation. Representative Banks subsequently published the Report of Investigation: Security Failures at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021 (“Banks Report”). The Banks Report identified many government intelligence shortcomings including the failure to adequately transmit and act on information obtained in advance of January 6, 2021.7 However, because Speaker Pelosi refused to appoint these Republican members to the Select Committee, they lacked authority to issue subpoenas or access the millions of pages of records collected by the Select Committee.

3Press Release: 30 Months Since the Jan. 6 Attack on the Capitol, United States Attorney’s Office, District of Columbia (Oct. 6, 2023). 4Jacqueline Alemany, et al., Red Flags, Washington Post, Oct. 31, 2021. 5The Department, USCP, Accessed Feb. 27, 2024. 6H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021). 7STAFF OF H. COMMITTEE ON H. ADMINISTRATION, 117TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION: SECURITY FAILURES AT THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL ON JAN. 6, 2021 (Comm. Print 2022). 4

The Subcommittee’s goal is not to rewrite the events of January 6 nor to promote a political narrative. It is the firm belief of the Subcommittee that it is Congress’s duty to provide full transparency to the American people so they can draw their own conclusions based on the information available, not just the information that supports one perspective. This report summarizes more than one year of independent investigation by the Subcommittee and findings based on nonpartisan evidence, firsthand accounts of events, and thorough comparisons of official records, official hearings, and letters at the direction of Chairman Barry Loudermilk.

https://cha.house.gov/_cache/files/d/9/d96ba6ce-03fb-4fc8-a4a7-5b5daf19d064/4F510144C1F427873D3298D955C8E19F.initial-findings-report.pdf

 

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT JURISDICTION

Rule X of the House Rules states that the Committee on House Administration (“Committee”) has jurisdiction over “services to the House” which includes the “administration of the House Office Buildings and of the House wing of the Capitol.”8 Included in the services to the House is the Committee’s responsibility to oversee the USCP. Additionally, federal law provides that Congress has the authority and responsibility to oversee the security of the Capitol. This statute provides that the “maintenance of the security systems of the Capitol buildings and grounds” is to be carried out at the direction of the Committee on House Administration. 9

When the Select Committee was created in the 117th Congress, its establishing resolution stated that “the records of the Select Committee shall become the records of such committee or committees designated by the Speaker[.]”10 On December 29, 2022, Speaker Pelosi wrote a letter pursuant to that clause directing Select Committee Chairperson Bennie Thompson to transfer Select Committee records to the Committee at the close of the 117th Congress.11 At the start of the 118th Congress, the resolution adopting the Rules of the House further reiterated that “any records obtained” by the Select Committee be transferred to the Committee. 12

The rules of the Committee grant the Subcommittee jurisdiction over all “matters relating to congressional security, accountability of the legislative branch security and safety apparatus, legislative branch operations, and such other matters as may be referred.”13 The rules of the Committee empower the Subcommittee to gather evidence on matters within its jurisdiction, specifically, with respect to congressional security and the accountability of legislative branch security.14

I: THE SELECT COMMITTEE

Democrats wasted no time before pointing fingers at President Trump for the events of January 6, 2021. The Select Committee’s conclusion—that President Trump was at fault for every tragedy that occurred at the Capitol that day—was determined before the Select Committee was even established. On January 7, 2021, Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Schumer called for President Trump to be immediately removed from office, whether it took using the 25th Amendment or impeachment.15 A few weeks later, Speaker Pelosi went as far as to say that President Trump could be an “accessory to murder.”16 When it became evident that President Trump was not going to be held accountable in the way that Speaker Pelosi wanted him to be, she then turned to establish the Select Committee in June of 2021.17 Without question, the Select Committee was used as a tool for Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats’ to manipulate the facts surrounding January 6 and place the blame solely at the feet of President Trump, regardless of where an actual investigation would take them.

Rule X, Rules of the House of Representatives, 118th Congress (Jan. 10, 2023). 92 U.S. Code § 1965 (1996); The code states this authority is granted to “the Committee on House Oversight” which, in 1999, was renamed the Committee on House Administration. 10 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021). 11 Letter from Nancy Pelosi to Bennie Thompson (Dec. 29, 2022). (on file with the Subcommittee). 12 H.R. Res. 5, 118th Cong. (2023). 13 Rule 17, Rules of the Committee on House Administration for the 118th Congress, 118th Congress (2023). 14 Rule 19, Rules of the Committee on House Administration for the 118th Congress, 118th Congress (2023). 5

FORMATION OF SPEAKER PELOSI’S PARTISAN SELECT COMMITTEE

The Select Committee was procedurally flawed before holding its first hearing. Unlike every previous select committee, House Democrats and Speaker Pelosi refused to permit the minority party to select the minority members appointed to the Select Committee. Additionally, because of this decision, despite House Democrats attempts to argue otherwise, the Select Committee did not have a ranking minority member. The Select Committee operated with a singular focus, not on the objectives specified in the resolution that created it, but on the partisan political objectives of Speaker Pelosi and the members of the Select Committee. On June 30, 2021, House Democrats passed H.Res. 503, establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol with a vote of 222-190.18 All Democrat Members voted in favor of creating the Select Committee, while only two Republican Members, Representatives Adam Kinzinger and Liz Cheney, joined them in supporting this resolution. 19

House Democrats modeled the Select Committee after the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (“Select Committee on Benghazi”). Unlike the Select Committee on Benghazi where the Speaker allowed the Minority Leader to select their own minority members, Speaker Pelosi refused to allow the Minority Leader to select minority members resulting in a solely partisan exercise determined to blame President Trump for the breach of the Capitol on January 6.

To continue reading for yourself you can find the Report Here

https://cha.house.gov/_cache/files/d/9/d96ba6ce-03fb-4fc8-a4a7-5b5daf19d064/4F510144C1F427873D3298D955C8E19F.initial-findings-report.pdf

 

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SPEAKER PELOSI’S UNPRECEDENTED DECISION TO REJECT MINORITY MEMBER APPOINTMENTS

The resolution establishing the Select Committee stated that the “Speaker shall appoint 13 members to the Select Committee.”21 The resolution allowed Speaker Pelosi to appoint eight members unilaterally and required Speaker Pelosi to appoint an additional five members after consultation with the minority leader.22 Speaker Pelosi appointed Representatives Zoe Lofgren,

15 Julian Borger, Democratic leaders call for Trump's removal from office, The Guardian, Jan. 7, 2021. 16 Evan Semones, Pelosi says Trump could be accessory to murder after Capitol riot, Politico, Jan. 20, 2021. 17 Claudia Grisales, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Launches Select Committee To Probe Jan. 6 Insurrection, NPR, June 24, 2021. 18 Roll Call 197, H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021). 19 Id. 20 Jonathan Weisman, Pelosi Picks 5 Democrats for Panel on Benghazi, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2024. 21 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021) (emphasis added). 22 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021). 6

Adam Schiff, Pete Aguilar, Stephanie Murphy, Jamie Raskin, and Bennie Thompson, who Speaker Pelosi selected to serve as chairperson. Speaker Pelosi also appointed Representative Liz Cheney to the Select Committee as one of her original eight majority selections.23 Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy selected Representatives Jim Jordan, Rodney Davis, Kelly Armstrong, and Troy Nehls, with Representative Jim Banks to serve as ranking member.24

Speaker Pelosi then made the unprecedented decision to deny seating two of the five Members Minority Leader McCarthy recommended — Representatives Banks and Jordan. Both of these Members were outspoken supporters of President Trump and likely would have disrupted Speaker Pelosi’s desire to use the Select Committee as a political messaging tool in her mission to prevent President Trump from holding public office again. Representative Schiff confirmed this when he said, “[h]ad the Speaker seated on the committee the circus clowns [referring to Representatives Banks and Jordan], the insurrection sympathizers, it would’ve been just a shit show… It wouldn’t have been worth watching.”25

After refusing Minority Leader McCarthy’s selections, Speaker Pelosi then appointed Representative Kinzinger, leaving the committee with nine members, not thirteen. As a result, the Select Committee only included Speaker Pelosi’s hand-picked Members. 26 The Select Committee held hearings, issued subpoenas, and published a flawed report without the number of members required by H.Res. 503.

House Democrats failed to identify any other previous example of a Speaker of the House refusing to seat minority-recommended members to a select committee as justification for Speaker Pelosi’s decision. House Democrats attempted to justify their decision for the Select Committee proceeding without minority-selected members by pointing to the 2005 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (“Katrina Select Committee”).27 The House resolution establishing the Katrina Select Committee instructed that committee membership “shall be composed of twenty members appointed by the Speaker, of whom nine shall be appointed after consultation with the Minority Leader.”28 The Katrina Select Committee failed to seat twenty members only because then-Minority Leader Pelosi refused to submit minority members to be appointed to the committee.29 In court filings, House Democrats asserted the Katrina Select Committee established a precedent for a select committee operating with no participation from the minority.30 However, House Democrats failed to acknowledge an important distinction between a select committee where the minority refuses to recommend members, as was the case with the Katrina Select Committee, and a select committee where the majority refuses to seat the minority selections, like in the case of the Select Committee.

23 Press Release, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Names Members to Select Committee to Investigate January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (July 1, 2021). 24 Olivia Beavers, McCarthy makes his 5 GOP picks for Jan. 6 select committee, Politico, July 19, 2021. 25 Robert Draper, et al., Inside the Jan. 6 Committee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2023. (emphasis added). 26 Brian Naylor, Pelosi Rejects 2 GOP Nominees For The Jan. 6 Panel, Citing The Integrity Of The Probe, NPR, July 21, 2021. 27 Kyle Cheney, Jan. 6 committee rebuts challenges to its legitimacy, citing Katrina and Benghazi probes, Politico, Jan. 13, 2022. 28 H.R. Res. 437, 109th Congress. 29 Carl Hulse, G.O.P. in House Plans Inquiry Despite Democrats' Boycott, N.Y. Times, Sep. 22, 2005. 30 Def. Memo of Law in Opp. to Plaintiffs at 18, Budowich v. Pelosi, 1:21-cv-03366-JEB (D.D.C). 7

Speaker Pelosi knew her actions were unprecedented. She specifically acknowledged the unprecedented nature of her decision in her July 2021 press release announcing her decision to reject two Republican Members.31 This decision to reject minority representation on the Select Committee underscores the partisan nature of its formation, thus casting a partisan shadow on all its hearings and reports.

 

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VICE CHAIR—NOT RANKING MEMBER

The Select Committee did not have a ranking minority member, it had a vice chair. Instead, shortly before hearings began the Select Committee named Representative Cheney as “Vice Chair.” The position of vice chair is distinct and different from a ranking minority member as clearly understood by House Rules, conference and caucus rules, and precedent.32

H. Res. 503 specifically required the Chair of the Select Committee to “consult with the ranking minority member” in certain circumstances. For example, the Chair of the Select Committee could only issue a subpoena “upon consultation with the ranking minority member.”33 When House Democrats drafted and passed H Res. 503, they could have given the Select Committee Chair unilateral authority to issue subpoenas; however, H. Res. 503 included the requirement that the Select Committee Chair should only have the ability to issue a subpoena after “consultation with the ranking minority member.”34

VICE CHAIR CHENEY

Vice Chair is a common and well-understood term under House Rules. Rule XI of the Rules of the House for the 117th Congress stated that a “member of the majority party on each standing committee or subcommittee shall be designated by the chair of the full committee as the vice chair.”35 This provision goes on to articulate that if the chair of the committee is not present then the vice chair—who is a member of the same party as the chair—shall preside over the proceeding.36 Additionally, both the Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference use the term vice chair to describe a position junior to the chair to be filled by a Member from the same political party.37

Chairperson Bennie Thompson selected a Vice Chair of the Select Committee in the same manner House Rule XI instructs chairs of standing committees to select a vice chair. Chairperson Thompson initially offered the role of Vice Chair to Representative Jamie Raskin, a fellow Democrat,38 but Raskin declined and instead suggested that Representative Liz Cheney be named Vice Chair.39 Representative Raskin recommended Representative Cheney be named Vice Chair to give the impression that the Select Committee was bipartisan.40 Ultimately, Chairperson Thompson announced that he offered Representative Cheney the title of Vice Chair.41 Chairperson Thompson named Representative Cheney Vice Chair of the Select Committee in the same manner Vice Chairs are named under rule XI. Thus, Representative Cheney fulfilled the traditional Vice Chair role for the majority party on the Select Committee—not the role of a ranking minority member.

31 Press Release, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (July 21, 2021). 32 Rule XI, Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. (2021); Rule 14, Rules of the House Republican Conference, 118th Congress (2023); Rule 21, Rules of the Democratic Caucus, 118th Congress (2023). 33 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021). 34 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. § 5 (2021). 35 Rule XI, Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. (2021). 36 Id. 37 House Republican Conference Vice Chair Blake Moore, House GOP, Accessed Feb. 22, 2024. 38 Robert Draper, et al., Inside the Jan. 6 Committee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2023. 39 Id.

 

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NO RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

House Democrats incorrectly asserted that Representative Cheney was the ranking minority member of the Select Committee. A ranking minority member is not just a member of the minority party, but is a member of the minority party selected by the minority party to serve as ranking minority member. Although Representative Cheney was a member of the Republican party, she was not chosen by the minority as the Select Committee ranking minority member. Speaker Pelosi appointed Representative Cheney to the Select Committee as one of the eight selections specifically allocated by H. Res. 503 for the Democrat majority.

The term ranking minority member has a clear and understood meaning under House Rules. According to House Rule X Clause 5, the members of standing committees shall be elected “from nomination submitted by the respective party caucus or conference.”42 In the same manner that minority members of a committee are selected by the respective caucus, respective minority parties also select ranking minority members to serve on standing committees. Both the Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus Rules have procedures for appointing ranking members to committees, with their respective Steering Committees first nominating members for the role and then the conference or caucus voting on those recommendations.43 Both use similar language in their process to select members for chair and ranking member, and neither gives the opposing party’s leadership the power to select their ranking members.44 Based on House Rules and precedent, a ranking minority member is commonly understood to be the minority party member selected by the minority party.

Former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of a Select Committee subpoena for numerous reasons, including because H. Res. 503 required the Chair of the Select Committee to consult with the Ranking Member to order a deposition, including pursuant to a subpoena.45 In a Motion for Summary Judgment, House Democrats argued that Representative Cheney “by virtue of being the first minority party Member appointment to the Select Committee, is, by definition, the senior ranking minority member of the Select Committee.”46 The filing also incorrectly asserted that this interpretation of the term ranking minority member is “consistent with House practice and precedent,” as noted above. 47 Both of these assertions are incorrect.

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, House Democrats cited H. Res. 10 as justification for this interpretation of the term ranking minority member.48 H. Res. 10 appointed ranking minority members to standing committees in the 117th Congress.49 However, House Democrats failed to acknowledge that while ranking minority members are the first minority members appointed to standing committees, ranking minority members are first selected according to conference rules, offered by the minority, and not blocked by the majority. H. Res. 10 demonstrates the House practice that the ranking minority member is selected by the minority conference, not simply the first minority members named to a committee.

40 Id. 41 Annie Grayer et. al., Liz Cheney named vice chair of the January 6 select committee (Sept. 2, 2021). 42 Rule X, Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, 118th Cong. (2023). 43 Rule 14, Rules of the House Republican Conference, 118th Cong. (2023); Rule 21, Rules of the Democratic Caucus, 118th Cong. (2023). 44 Id. 45 Luke Broadwater, Meadows Sues Pelosi in Bid to Block Jan. 6 Committee Subpoena (Dec. 8, 2021); Complaint, at 28, Meadows v. Pelosi, 1:21-cv-3217-CJN (D.D.C.). 46 Def. Mot. For Summ. J., at 25, Meadows v. Pelosi, 1:21-cv-3217-CJN (D.D.C.).

A COMMITTEE WITHOUT RULES

House Democrats made yet another unprecedented decision when they chose to exempt the Select Committee from the clause in House Rule XI which requires all committees to adopt internal committee rules to govern committee operations.50 Rule XI requires that committee rules provide for equal time for majority and minority member asking alternate questions.51 Under Rule XI, committees “may adopt a rule” allotting more than five minutes for each member to ask witness questions but that time must be “equal for the majority party and the minority party.”52 This rule, and the concept of minority voice, is longstanding precedent of the House.

Instead of adopting committee rules, the Select Committee relied on H. Res. 503 as their quasi rules which gave Chairperson Bennie Thompson an unprecedented level of power over every action of the Select Committee allowing it to operate in ways other House Committees could not.

 

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STATED SELECT COMMITTEE OBJECTIVES

The Select Committee focused its work on President Donald Trump instead of investigating the issues outlined by the resolution that established the panel. H. Res. 503 contained specific objectives for the Select Committee, but its hearings and work product, specifically the Final Report, failed to adequately address those objectives. According to H. Res. 503, the Select Committee’s purpose was to identify, review, and evaluate:
(A) activities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and information sharing among the branches and other instrumentalities of government;

(B) the structure, coordination, operational plans, policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, including as such relate to State and local governments and nongovernmental entities, and particularly with respect to detecting, preventing, preparing for, and responding to targeted violence and domestic terrorism;

(C) the structure, authorities, training, manpower utilization, equipment, operational planning, and use of force policies of the United States Capitol Police;

(D) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for the sharing of intelligence and other information by Federal, State, and local agencies with the United States Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of the House of Representatives and Senate, the Government of the District of Columbia, including the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, the National Guard, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021, and the related policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence and other information, including elevating the security posture of the United States Capitol Complex, derived from instrumentalities of government, open sources, and online platforms; and

(E) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for interoperability between the United States Capitol Police and the National Guard, the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021.53

The mandate for the Select Committee does not mention “President Trump,” yet the Select Committee’s Final Report mentions him more than 1,900 times, revealing the actual focus of the Select Committee’s investigation. The Select Committee did not try to hide their partisan intent to legislatively prosecute President Trump — it memorialized it.

BUDGET AND STAFF

H. Res 503 empowered and enabled the Select Committee’s partisan agenda with an unlimited budget.54 The Select Committee leveraged its unlimited budget to hire Hollywood producers and consultants to push the Select Committees narrative to the American public.55 The Select Committee also spent a significant amount of taxpayer dollars on outside contractors.56 Based on the House of Representatives Statement of Disbursements, the Select Committee spent $13,840,833.80 in 2021 and 2022 combined.57 However, it is estimated that the Select Committee spent around $19,000,000 in other expenses.58 In comparison, this amount is significantly higher than the $7,000,000 spent by the Select Committee on Benghazi, which is the only select committee in history to operate with the same blank-check appropriation.59

The Select Committee also had the authority and ability to hire an unlimited number of staff.60 In total, the Select Committee had a staff of nearly 80 people, including former television producers hired specifically to choreograph the Select Committee’s made-for-tv hearings.61 The Select Committee also recruited hand-picked investigators such as the Select Committee’s Chief Investigative Counsel who, in 2009, was nominated by President Obama to serve as the United States Attorney for the Western District of Virginia.62 The Chief Investigative Counsel served as a U.S. Attorney under Attorney General Eric Holder and, according to Holder, the two had “a long history.”63 While serving as the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Virginia, the Chief Investigative Counsel even served on Attorney General Holder’s Advisory Committee which advised the Attorney General on “emerging policy issues.”64

Traditionally, budget and staff slots are allocated between the majority and minority on committees and select committees under House precedent and practice.65 However, because Speaker Pelosi hand-picked every member of the Select Committee, there was no division of resources between the majority and minority. The Select Committee, with its unlimited budget, operated as one unified body with no minority or dissenting views.

53 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021). 54 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. § 6 (f) (2021). 55 Id. 56 H. Doc. No. 117-84; H. Doc. No. 118-5. 57Id. 58 Warren Rojas, House weaponization panel seeks to eclipse January 6 committee's $18M+ budget despite rocky start, Business Insider, Mar 8, 2023. 59 Two years, $7 million, 800 pages later, GOP Benghazi report lands with a thud, PBS News Hour, Jun 28, 2016. 60 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021). 61 Robert Draper, et al., Inside the Jan. 6 Committee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2023.

 

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PRIMETIME MEDIA HEARINGS

The Select Committee did not want to hold hearings; it wanted to grab the American public’s attention and present a political narrative. The Select Committee enlisted the help of Hollywood producers to edit USCP closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage, as well as videos of depositions and transcribed interviews, for use at public hearings.66 The Select Committee held eleven hearings, with multiple hearings airing live during the coveted 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. “primetime” slot. With the help of their well-connected Hollywood producer, they secured primetime coverage from most major networks.67

During the Select Committee’s hearings, they had a full production team located everywhere from Chicago to Las Vegas, dedicated to producing graphics, creating compelling narrative videos, and monitoring social media to gauge public reaction in real time.68 According to New York Times investigative reporting, “The committee’s intention was to aim for the impact of the televised 1973 Senate Watergate Committee hearings — which started off with little public attention, facing the headwinds of President Richard Nixon’s overwhelming re-election, but would convince skeptical Republicans and help turn the tide of public opinion.”69

The format of the Select Committee’s hearings was unlike other House hearings where majority and minority members alternate asking questions with five minutes intervals for each member to ask questions. The format of questioning is traditionally specified in each committee’s rules.70 The Select Committee’s hearings were tightly choreographed, with each one requiring multiple, meticulous rehearsals which could last up to five hours.71 Only two members of the Select Committee had active roles during each of the Select Committee’s highly scripted hearings — a strategy adopted for maximum messaging impact at each hearing.

The Select Committee’s goal was sensationalism. According to public reporting, every word in every hearing was fully scripted.72 During hearings, the Member of the Select Committee designated to speak read their script from a teleprompter in front of the dais. The scripts were also sent to news outlets in advance of the hearings to “help facilitate coverage and cue camera angles for dramatic moments.”73 The Select Committee focused more on pushing their predetermined narrative and presenting a show-trial to the American public than investigating the security failures of January 6, 2021.

62 Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, United States Attorney Timothy J. Heaphy Western District of Virginia (Nov. 24, 2014). 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 H.R. Res. 316, 117th Cong. (2021). 66 Annie Karni, The committee hired a TV executive to produce the hearings for maximum impact, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2022. 67 Robert Draper, et al., Inside the Jan. 6 Committee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2023. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Rule 9, Rules of the Committee on House Administration for the 118th Congress, 118th Cong. (2023). 71 Robert Draper, et al., Inside the Jan. 6 Committee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2023.

CONCLUSION

The Select Committee was a partisan exercise from the beginning and its work product and findings must be carefully weighed against its partisan formation. The Select Committee’s hearings and final report are tainted by the unprecedented partisan decisions made by Speaker Pelosi. The Select Committee's Final Report contains some facts, but the conclusions and findings presented were predetermined due to the committee's partisan nature.

Speaker Pelosi’s unprecedented decision to reject the minority party’s selections for the Select Committee set the tone for how the Select Committee would function. It meant that the Select Committee lacked a ranking minority member and instead operated with a vice chair, two distinctly different roles which House Democrats incorrectly asserted were interchangeable. As a result, some Select Committee actions were procedurally flawed. The Select Committee effectively operated as a federal prosecutor targeting President Trump. However, this was a prosecution without due process. There was no cross-examination of the witnesses, and the Select Committee was determined to obtain one narrative while failing to effectively question witnesses and uncover the truth based on facts.

House Democrats had the power to establish a Select Committee with no rules and without a requirement that the ranking minority member be consulted for certain actions. Instead, they included a requirement that the Chair of the Select Committee consult with the ranking minority member — which was impossible after Speaker Pelosi rejected the minority party’s selected members for the Select Committee.

This allowed Democrats to hand-pick the Republican members they thought were suitable while also claiming to be bipartisan for the sake of good television. The Select Committee accomplished its mission — for almost two years it promoted their predetermined narrative through made-for-Hollywood trials to the American public rather than investigating the security failures of January 6, 2021.

72 Id. 73 Id. 13

 

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II: ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARANCY: WHAT THE SELECT COMMITTEE DID NOT SHOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

The Select Committee collected and reviewed significantly more information about the underlying causes of January 6 than it released on its website. At the conclusion of the 117th Congress, the Select Committee released its highly promoted Final Report and carefully selected records to accompany it, that as their website suggests, supports the Select Committee’s narrative. However, the documents released on the U.S. Government Publishing Office (“GPO”) website do not represent all documents obtained by the Select Committee during its existence, and specifically excludes information that did not support the Select Committee’s narrative.

Chairperson Thompson admitted that the Select Committee did not preserve hundreds of video recordings made by the Select Committee during transcribed interviews and depositions.74 Chairperson Thompson also admitted that as Chair of the Select Committee, he failed to archive certain transcripts of transcribed interviews conducted by the Select Committee, in violation of House Rules.75 This raises the obvious question: why did Chairperson Thompson not want House Republicans to see these records?

Additionally, the Select Committee selectively interviewed certain witnesses and publicly released their testimony before interviewing other witnesses who may have provided contradictory testimony. One example of this is the Select Committee’s decision to invite Cassidy Hutchinson for a public hearing before interviewing firsthand witnesses whose testimony may have corroborated or contradicted hers. On June 20, 2022, Cassidy Hutchinson participated in her fourth transcribed interview with the Select Committee, in which she leveled previously unheard allegations. During this interview, Hutchinson testified that while in his motorcade after his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump attempted to grab the vehicle’s steering wheel from the United States Secret Service (“USSS”) driver and lunged at another USSS agent in the vehicle. Eight days later, the Select Committee – knowing that this new testimony would garner significant media attention – scheduled a public hearing with Hutchinson as the witness.

During these eight days, the Select Committee did not interview either of the two USSS agents referenced in her testimony, nor did the Select Committee interview any other individual implicated in her testimony. Although the Subcommittee was not provided transcripts of the interviews with these USSS agents, which is in violation of House Rules, records obtained by the Subcommittee indicate that the Select Committee waited until November 2022 to interview them – well over four months after Hutchinson’s public testimony, and when it was obvious Republicans would win control of the House.

The Select Committee failed to archive all of its records at the end of the 117th Congress. These records include evidence that undermines some of the most headline-grabbing themes of the Select Committee hearings, as well as evidence that pertains to the Select Committee’s investigation but did not align with its narrative. While the Subcommittee has endeavored to recover all of the missing records, the fact that the Select Committee did not archive or publicly disclose this information must be considered when evaluating the Select Committee’s hearings and Final Report. The Select Committee should have archived all materials, not just the supporting materials.

 

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MISSING SELECT COMMITTEE RECORDS

All committee chairs have a responsibility to archive noncurrent committee records at the end of each Congress.76 It is a chair’s responsibility to transfer these records to the Clerk of the House (“House Clerk”), who subsequently stores those records with the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”).77 The House Clerk’s office generally holds these records for two years prior to sending them to NARA.78 The resolution establishing the Select Committee added an additional reporting requirement by mandating all records of the committee be transferred to any committee designated by the Speaker of the House.79 Days before the new Republican majority was sworn in, Speaker Pelosi sent a letter to Chairperson Thompson designating Select Committee records be transferred to the Committee on House Administration.80 At the beginning of the 118th Congress, H. Res. 5 reiterated that all records from the Select Committee would be transferred to the Committee on House Administration.81

Republicans on the Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Oversight immediately inventoried all records turned over by the Select Committee. This included both printed documents and digital records. While some records were organized and inventoried, most of the records turned over by the Select Committee were contained on two hard drives labeled as a production from their e-discovery software. During this initial document review, the Subcommittee determined that the Select Committee archived and provided to the Subcommittee roughly 270 transcribed interviews of witness testimonies and fewer than three terabytes of digital data.

House Rule VII requires committees to submit noncurrent records to the House Clerk at the end of each Congress.82 While recordkeeping practices vary by congressional office, the House Clerk operates the Office of Art and Archives to assist committees with identifying which records must be retained permanently.83 Under House Rule VII, it is the responsibility of “the chair of each committee” to “transfer to the House Clerk any noncurrent records of such committee.”84 House Rules continue to define noncurrent records as “an official, permanent record of the committee (including any record of a legislative, oversight, or other activity of such committee).”85 The House Clerk created a manual to provide additional guidance to committee chairs for the process of archiving records under House Rule VII. In that manual, the House Clerk specifies that depositions, transcripts, executive branch communications, et al. are among the records that should be archived pursuant to House Rules.86

Nevertheless, as part of its investigation, the Subcommittee learned that the Select Committee failed to archive and subsequently provide the Subcommittee any of its video recordings of witness interviews, as many as 900 interview summaries or transcripts, more than one terabyte of digital data, and over 100 deleted or encrypted documents. The failure to provide the Subcommittee with these records raises serious concerns about the content of these records and their implication on the Select Committee’s narrative. Furthermore, the failure to archive these records rests on Chairperson Thompson who had an obligation under House Rule VII to “transfer to the Clerk any noncurrent records.”87 Failure to archive all noncurrent records, the corresponding transcript, and the recovered password-protected files is in violation of House Rules and obstructs the Subcommittee’s investigation into Capitol security failures.

76 Rule VII, Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. (2021). 77 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ARCHIVAL RECORDS OF CONGRESS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2023). 78 Id. 79 H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021). 80 Letter from Nancy Pelosi to Bennie Thompson (Dec. 29, 2022). (on file with the Subcommittee). 81 H.R. Res. 5, 118th Cong. (2023).

OVER ONE TERABYTE OF DIGITAL DATA MISSING

The Select Committee produced a significant amount of digital data. Based on an inventory of this digital data and statements from Chairperson Thompson, the Subcommittee discovered that the Select Committee failed to archive more than an entire terabyte of digital data.
In a July 7, 2022, letter to Chairman Loudermilk, Representative Thompson claimed that the Select Committee archived “over 4-terabyte” of digital data.88 Specifically, Representative Thompson wrote that the Select Committee “used an e-discovery platform to manage its investigative records” and “worked with its e-discovery platform contractor to create an archive file.”89 Representative Thompson went on to say that permanent records, totaling over four terabytes of data, “were electronically archived in that file.”90 However, after reviewing this archive file, the Subcommittee received less than three terabytes of digital data from the Select Committee. One terabyte is a substantial amount of missing data. One terabyte of data is equivalent to 6.5 million document pages such as PDFs or office files, 500 hours of high definition video, or 250,000 photos.

The Subcommittee received a total of six hard drives from the Select Committee. Contained in these hard drives were document productions from individuals, agencies, departments, and other entities that responded to the Select Committee’s requests for information. These files included emails, text messages, and other communications. The Select Committee also archived some of its incoming and outgoing correspondence with these individuals, agencies, departments, or other entities. Lastly, the Select Committee archived only some of the interview transcripts it conducted as well as the accompanying exhibits.

Included in the physical files the Select Committee archived was a memorandum from the Select Committee’s e-discovery platform contractor, dated December 28, 2022, in which the contractor explicitly states that the Select Committee excluded “Committee work-product” and “[select] documents the [Select Committee] deemed as sensitive” from its archiving process.91 It is unclear what files were excluded, but it is clear that the Select Committee instructed its e discovery contractor to proactively remove certain files from the archive it prepared and subsequently turned over to the Subcommittee.

 

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Funny how that does that sometimes.
I wonder what causes those lines.

 

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There are 81 pages to this Report.
I have posted 17.
If you would like to continue reading the report, you can find it at:

https://cha.house.gov/_cache/files/d/9/d96ba6ce-03fb-4fc8-a4a7-5b5daf19d064/4F510144C1F427873D3298D955C8E19F.initial-findings-report.pdf

 

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Although on page 72 I found the mention of the Gallows interesting.

GALLOWS: WHY DO WE NOT KNOW WHO BUILT THEM

One of the photos associated with the events of January 6, 2021, is the placing of the gallows erected on the grounds of the Capitol that morning.456 Photos of the infamous gallows were featured prominently by the Select Committee. Despite the infamy of this event, those responsible for its construction have never been identified.457

At approximately 6:25 a.m. on January 6, 2021, a group of individuals appear in camera on 1st Street NW rolling a large bundle of lumber with wheels. The group walked the bundle across Constitution Avenue and onto the grass at Union Square.

According to USCP CCTV obtained by the Subcommittee, between 6:30 a.m. and 7:15 a.m. the group constructed the platform and two main pillars of the gallows, only leaving off the crossbeam. During this time, the apparent group leader along with one other person, left the group and walked down 3rd Street, heading north. They returned a few minutes later with coffee, and the entire group left the scene. Despite the leader’s distinctive description, a man wearing a long trench coat, long white scarf, fedora-type hat, and walking with a cane, he has never been identified by investigators.

Based on USCP CCTV footage, at approximately 1:00 p.m., the group of five returned to the scene and the presumed leader, now wearing a baseball cap, installed the final crossbeam and added the noose made of bright orange rope. Shortly after construction was complete, all five men left.

The Capitol Police Guidelines for Conducting an Event on United States Capitol Grounds explicitly state, “[t]emporary structures of any kind may not be erected on Capitol Grounds,” which would imply that gallows—a temporary structure—may not be allowed on Capitol Grounds and would immediately be addressed and/or removed once discovered.458 However, these gallows were left untouched by USCP officers from 6:00 a.m. on January 6 until 9:15 a.m. on January 7.

With dozens of cameras focused on the events on the west side of the Capitol, combined with the active patrolling by USCP officers, it is questionable why this structure—in clear violation of USCP guidelines459—was able to be assembled in multiple phases and stay up throughout the duration of the day without any intervention from USCP. Through a review of the recordings of USCP radio transmissions on January 6, there was no mention of the gallows throughout the whole day.