It is apparent that the church fathers evidenced theological growth and development as forerunners to the eventual systemization of the doctrine of the Trinity. While this progression does not necessarily follow a systematically consistent pattern, it nevertheless shows that the subject of the internal relationships amongst the Godhead was addressed with increasing intentionality. The fact that these men, among others, laid a foundation from which the council gathered at Nicaea could then be built upon is clearly evident. The forbearers’ rich tradition of theological meditation in the Word is clearly evident, highlighting the fact that theology should be continually moving us toward a deeper understanding of the great mysteries of truths revealed therein. Regardless of Origen or Nicaea’s prominence in this particular arena, it will always serve the church well to be reminded of our historical heritage through continual and consistent reflection.
Tracing the Thread of Trinitarian Thought from Ignatius to Origen | Maranatha Baptist Seminary
It seems that in Numenius it is the contemplation of the first intellect by the second that gives rise to the forms, or Platonic ideas;
Origen, as a Christian, holds that the contemplation is mutual, since “no-one knows the Son but the Father and no-one knows the Father but the Son” (Matthew 11.27). Thus he maintains, on the one hand, that the Son, as truth (John 14.6), knows all that is in the mind of the Father; the infamous proviso that the Son does not see the Father signifies only that within the Godhead vision is not mediated by our physical organs (
Princ. 1.1.8). On the other hand, when we read that the Son is the wisdom and power of the Father (1 Corinthians 1.24) and that the world was created through him (Hebrews 1.2), we are to understand that he is that divine helpmate who declares at Proverbs 8.22 that the Lord created her in the beginning of his ways, and at Wisdom 7.26 that she is the mirror of his unspotted majesty. The verb “created” in this text (which
Origen prefers to the alternative reading “possessed”) does not imply that the Son has a temporal beginning, but that, having no other substrate than the Father’s will, he expresses that will more perfectly than the things that are “made” from matter. It is inconceivable that the Father could ever have lacked wisdom, and equally inconceivable to Origen that this wisdom could ever have taken a different form from the one that it now possesses as the second person or hypostasis of the Trinity (
Princ. 1.2.2).
He is the first theologian to state unequivocally that the “three hypostases” which constitute the Trinity are eternal not only in nature, but in their hypostatic character; there was never a time when wisdom was the latent thought of the Father and had not yet come forth as speech.
Though Origen rejects it, this was in fact the prevailing thesis of most Christian writing in the second century when it undertook to explain the Fourth Evangelist’s assertion that the one who became incarnate was the Logos who had been with the Father as
theos (god) if not
ho theos (God) from the beginning (John 1.1). Since it was this speech or word that created the world, it was argued, there would have been no reason for it to exist before the creation as a distinct hypostasis. If he existed at all, it was as the
logos endiathetos, the word within, which had not yet emerged from the mind as
logos prophorikos, or verbal utterance. In this latent phase he could be identified (as Philo had already argued) with the paradigm, or world of forms, which supplies the Platonic demiurge with his pattern for the creation. Clement of Alexandria accepts this equation, albeit perhaps without denying the hypostatic eternity of the Logos (Edwards 2000). Origen, however, resists the interpretation of Logos as “speech” because there are some who take this to imply that the second person is merely a function or epiphenomenon of the first (
CommJohn 1.24.151; Orbe 1991). Logos, in his view, is one of the numerous designations (
epinoiai) which are conferred on the second person to define his relation, not to the Father (as “Son” and “Wisdom” do) but to his creatures (
CommJohn 2.9.66 etc.): he is Logos as the paradigm and parent of all the
logikai, or rational beings, who exercise reason only by participation in him. He cannot be identified with the world of forms, or Platonic ideas, because to Origen these ideas are imaginary entities which the Greeks absurdly suppose to be independent of the Creator (
Princ. 2.3.6). It appears then that he endorsed the older and more literal reading of the
Timaeus, according to which the Demiurge, the forms and matter are three autonomous principles of being. Before him Philo, Alcinous, and Clement of Alexandria had construed the forms as thoughts in the mind of the Demiurge, while Alexander of Aphrodisias held that they gave content to God’s eternal contemplation of himself (Armstrong 1960). Origen himself opines that all genera, all species and even the archetypes of all particular things are eternally present in the mind of God (
Princ. 1.4.5), but he holds this as a Christian antidote to difficulties which arise from the temporality of the world.
Origen (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)