twinc said:
what is it - is it one off or widespread - why is it unforgiveable etc ? - any comments - twinc
Interaction with the book that I believe is the best Protestant critique of Catholicism in our times:
Roman Catholics and Evangelicals: Agreements and Differences, by Norman L. Geisler and Ralph E. Mackenzie (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1995).]
Matthew 12:31-32
The Catholic argues that this passage makes reference to forgiveness after death: something that is anathema to Protestantism. This particular super-serious sin (blasphemy against the Holy Spirit) is not forgiven, yet it is clear that
Jesus is presupposing that there are other sins that are forgiven after death: which is one of the tenets of purgatory: forgiveness for and temporal punishment of sins after death for the person
who is already saved and will inevitably make it to heaven in due course. The passage was interpreted in this fashion by several great historical exegetes:
St. Augustine (354-430)
Pope St. Gregory the Great (c. 540-604)
St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153)
The Venerable Bede (c. 672-735)
Geisler, surprisingly for one schooled in philosophy (his doctorate), doesn’t seem to grasp the logical argument here, since he responds to a straw man of his own making and not the argument above. He asks (p. 335):
How can the denial that this sin will . . . ever be forgiven, even after death, be the basis for speculating that sins will be forgiven in the next life?
I reply that mentioning “the age to come” obviously assumes the premise that such things can happen in the afterlife; after death. Otherwise,
why mention it? We don’t include in our observations what we regard as a falsehood or impossible. No one would say, for example, “a circle is round and also is square.” The first thing is obviously true, and the second is categorically impossible.
If Jesus thought (like Protestants) that there is no forgiveness (or purgatory) after death (as a similar categorical impossibility),
then He would have never mentioned even its theoretical potentiality. He simply wouldn’t bring it up at all. He doesn’t teach falsehood, being God and omniscient. The final clause wouldn’t be in the text.
But there it is!
The “polemical structure” of the Catholic argument in this instance is similar to the biblical argument for praying to someone other than God, found in Luke 16 (remarkably unnoticed by Protestants who, again, deny a thing that Jesus plainly asserts). I explored that in
another article of mine:
Luke 16:24
Abraham says no (Luke 16:25-26), just as God will say no to a prayer not according to His will. He asks him again, begging (Luke 16:27-28).
Abraham refuses again, saying (16:29): “They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them.’” He asks a third time (16:30), and Abraham refuses again, reiterating the reason why (16:31).
. . . If we were not supposed to ask saints to pray for us, I think this story would be almost the very last way to make that supposed point.
Abraham would simply have said,
“you shouldn’t be asking me for anything; ask God!” In the same way, analogously, angels refuse worship when it is offered, because only God can be worshiped [I cited Rev 19:9-10; 22:89]. St. Peter did the same thing [Acts 10:25-26]. So did St. Paul and Barnabas [Acts 14:11-15].
If the true theology is that Abraham cannot be asked an intercessory request, then Abraham would have noted this
and refused to even hear it. But instead he heard the request [
three times!] and said no.
Jesus couldn’t possibly have taught a false principle.
Likewise (following the analogy above to the argument about prayer), if there is no such thing as forgiveness “in the age to come”
Jesus would not have alluded to it. The fact that
one sin can’t be forgiven even in the next life
does not prove that none can be forgiven, just as Abraham’s (not God’s!) refusal to grant one prayer does not prove that no one can pray to anyone other than God. It proves, rather, that not all prayers (including prayers offered to saints or angels) are answered as the one praying would like them to be answered. God or the saint or angel may refuse the petition.
Ironically, Geisler (in the midst of a different argument against purgatory), refers to the rich man praying to Abraham (he uses the description, “cried out”). Moreover, he agrees with my contention that this passage is not a parable...
Geisler then argues (p. 335):
[T]he passage is not even speaking about punishment, which Catholics argue will occur in purgatory. So how could this text be used to support the concept of purgatorial punishment?
But this is not the Catholic argument in the first place; it is, rather, that forgiveness of sins after death is one essential aspect of purgatory, which this passage supports. It’s a
partial proof of purgatory, not a full one (every particular aspect of purgatory). But it is taking the reader to “waters” that are strange for Protestants: very murky and over their heads.
He continues (p. 335) to miss the main point:
Purgatory involves only venial sins, but this sin . . . is mortal, being eternal and unforgivable . . . even if this passage did imply punishment, it is not for those who will eventually be saved . . . but for those who never will be saved . . . It only indicates the lack of real biblical support for the doctrine.
Remarkably enough (for such a generally good debater), he never engages the argument (explained above) as actually used by Catholics. Geisler totally fails to refute the Catholic argument, derived from one as great as St. Augustine (much beloved by Protestants), since all he did was flail away after straw men and cardboard caricatures the whole time.
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/2017/02/armstrong-vs-geisler-1-purgatory-mt-1232.html